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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an account of 'flourishing' that is relevant 
to health care provision, both in terms of the flourishing of the individual 
patient and carer, and in terms of the flourishing of the caring institution.  It is 
argued that, unlike related concepts such as 'happiness', 'well-being' or 'quality 
of life', 'flourishing' uniquely has the power to capture the importance of the 
vulnerability of human being.  Drawing on the likes of Heidegger and 
Nussbaum, it is argued that humans are at once beings who are autonomous 
and thereby capable of making sense of their lives, but also subject to the 
contingencies of their bodies and environments.  To flourish requires that one 
engages, imaginatively and creatively, with that contingencies.  The experience 
of illness, highlighting the vulnerability of the human being, thereby becomes 
an important experience, stimulating reflection in order to make sense of one's 
life as a narrative.  To flourish, it is argued, is to tell as story of one's life, 
realistically engaging with vulnerability and suffering, and thus creating a 
framework through which one can meaningful and constructively go on with 
one's life. 
 
Key words:  Vulnerability; narrative; well-being; happiness; Heidegger; 
Nussbaum; MacIntyre. 
 
Introduction 
This paper eǆploƌes the ƌole that the ĐoŶĐept of ͚flouƌishiŶg͛ ŵight plaǇ iŶ 
understanding and evaluating health care.  Our aim is not to provide an all-
encompassing account of human flourishing, but rather to identify what it 
might mean to flourish as a patient, a carer, and indeed as a caring institution.  
While many concepts have been employed in an attempt to capture, even to 
ŵeasuƌe, the desiƌaďle outĐoŵes of health Đaƌe pƌoǀisioŶ, suĐh as ͚ǁell-ďeiŶg͛, 
͚ƋualitǇ of life͛, oƌ ͚ĐopiŶg͛, ǁe ǁill aƌgue that the ĐoŶĐept of ͚flouƌishiŶg͛ is 
uniquely appropriate, because it grasps the struggle and challenge faced by 
vulnerable patients and indeed by carers, who themselves may be burdened 
and stressed by the demands of caring.  It is typically assumed that to flourish, 
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a person must act in accord with their nature (Trigg 2005, p. 8). It will be 
aƌgued that a ƌigoƌouslǇ aƌtiĐulated ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ͚flouƌishiŶg͛ ƌespoŶds to a 
vulnerability that is inherent to human nature, and thus to the challenge that 
such vulnerability poses, especially in the context of illness and disease, for 
anyone striving to live well.  Thus to flourish can be neither a transitory state 
nor mental condition, as say happiness might, nor a final goal or telos.  
Flourishing rather characterises a life or an extending period of a life, and is an 
active and ongoing struggle to maintain meaning and purpose in the face of 
adversity, rather than the final achievement of a stable state of contentment.  
As such, flourishing requires not merely material aid to alleviate the suffering 
engendered by, say, injury and disease, but also narrative resources through 
which the one burdened can make sense of their lives, and thus go on 
coherently, as patient or carer. 
 
Flourishing and Vulnerability 
Many arguments in philosophy, ethics and bioethics focus upon the inherent 
vulnerability of the human being.  Thus, philosophers as diverse as Martin 
Heidegger (1962), Martha Nussbaum (2001), and Deryck Beyleveld and Roger 
Brownsword (2001) have explored, in different ways, this aspect of what it is to 
be human. 
Heideggeƌ͛s aŶalǇsis of ǁhat it is to ďe huŵaŶ, Đaptuƌed iŶ his teƌŵ Dasein 
(1962, p. 27), focuses around the question of human mortality, which he terms 
͚ďeiŶg-towards-death͛ ;pp. ϮϳϵffͿ.  HuŵaŶs aƌe ďeiŶgs that are not merely 
mortal, but are uniquely aware of their own mortality.  To live authentically is 
to live in the face of this knowledge, and not to deny it.  Yet more profoundly, 
Heideggeƌ͛s aŶalǇsis of Dasein focuses on the finitude of human existence.  In 
using the German term Dasein ;that siŵplǇ ŵeaŶs ͚eǆisteŶĐe͛ aŶd as suĐh had 
a quasi-technical usage in the philosophies of Leibniz and Kant) Heidegger tries 
to capture two qualities of human nature.  On one side humans are merely 
͚theƌe͛ ;Da), contingent creatures, and as such like any other animal, subject to 
the variability of our physical environment and the accident of our genetics.  
Yet, as being (SeinͿ, ouƌ ͚BeiŶg is aŶ issue foƌ͛ us ;p. ϯϮͿ.  This is to saǇ that 
humans worry about what their existence means, and thus how they ought to 
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live their lives  Crucially, they have the capacity for autonomous choice, and 
this moves them beyond a mere animal subservience to their environment or 
physical body.  The irony of the human condition is thus that we 
simultaneously have imagination, and the capacity to conjure an almost 
limitless array of possibilities for ourselves, and yet finite bodies and finite 
tiŵe.  It is at this eǀeƌǇdaǇ leǀel that ͚ďeiŶg toǁaƌds death͛ has its gƌeatest 
purchase.  For in every choice a person makes, they rule out and potentially 
close off a thousand more.  In the context of the present discussion, disease 
and injury impose even greater limitations.  Injury and disease emphasise the 
ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ of a peƌsoŶ͛s eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt aŶd ďodǇ.  The experience of illness is 
the experience of human finitude (and ultimately mortality); as such it 
demands an authentic response that acknowledges finitude as such.  This, we 
will argue, is the first step towards flourishing as a patient. 
Martha Nussbaum appeals to ancient Greek literature and ethics to correct the 
over-emphasis that modern Kantianism has placed upon human autonomy and 
rationality (2001, pp. 4-5).  In Heideggerian terms, Kantian ethics focuses more 
or less exclusively upon Sein (and thus choice) as opposed to Da (and 
contingency or luck).  In the context of health care this Kantianism is reflected 
in the emphasis that the first wave of bioethics placed upon autonomy, for 
example in championing patient choice and patient rights.  While this was an 
important move in challenging medical paternalism, it came at the cost of 
neglecting the very condition of patient-hood.  Disease and injury inflict an 
iŶĐoŵpeteŶĐe that Đuƌtails, to a gƌeateƌ oƌ lesseƌ degƌee, oŶe͛s aďilitǇ to ŵake 
rational and thus autonomous choices. 
Nussbaum argues that, in contrast to modern Kantianism, the ancient Greek 
poets find in human being something akin to a plant (and in a metaphor from 
Pindar, a vine (2001, p. 1)).  As such, the individual human is the product of the 
conditions within which it grows and the actions of those who cultivate it.  The 
human being is vulnerable to contingency or luck.  Further, Nussbaum suggests 
that there lies in this very vulnerability something of the beauty of human 
existence.  The vulnerable creature differs in its value from the impermeable 
hardness of the gem stone (p. 2).  The Kantian denial of vulnerability is thus 
one sided, precisely in its failure to recognise the value and beauty of that 
vulnerability.  Yet there is a truth in Kantianism, and one that is articulated for 
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the Greeks by Plato.  Humans do indeed aspire to a certain form of 
invulnerability, and do so through the celebration of rational and self-sufficient 
choice.  Plato offers the example of Glaucon, who Socrates leads to a love of 
ŵatheŵatiĐs.  “uĐh ĐhoiĐe seeŵs to ĐleaŶse the huŵaŶ of the ͚͟ďaƌŶaĐles͟ aŶd 
the ͞seaǁeed͟ of passioŶ, the ͞ŵaŶǇ stoŶǇ aŶd ǁild thiŶgs that haǀe ďeeŶ 
eŶĐƌusted all oǀeƌ it͟' ;ϮϬϬϭ, p. ϱ [ĐitiŶg Plato͛s Republic, 612A]).  The tension 
between vulnerability and autonomy thereby becomes the crucial context in 
which the question of how the human being should live its life, and thus what 
goods it should choose, must be made.  Again, it is our contention that in the 
face of disease and injury this tension becomes most severe and the problem 
of the good life, and thus how to flourish, more perplexing and elusive. 
Beyleveld and Brownsword have offered an account of dignity that recognises 
human vulnerability (2001, see especially pp. 114-117).  Accounts of dignity are 
frequently grounded in an emphasis on autonomy (again, perhaps most 
influentially, from the Kantian tradition).  On such an account, to act with 
dignity is to act autonomously and rationally.  The application of such an 
account in the context of health care risks failing to recognise the routine 
incapacity of the patient to make rational decisions.  While advocates or 
proxies may make rational decisions on behalf of the patient who lacks 
autonomy, the general thrust of the argument tends to be to work to the 
ƌestoƌatioŶ of the patieŶt͛s autoŶoŵǇ, aŶd thus to theiƌ eŵpoǁeƌŵeŶt.  
Beyleveld and Brownsword challenge this as a one-sided account.  Dignity, for 
them, is a quality of human behaviour, but a quality that is expressed in the 
face of contingency and vulnerability, rather than being the pure realisation of 
rational autonomy.  Dignity is realised as much through restraint, restricting 
and guiding the actions of the vulnerable and incompetent patient, preventing 
them from behaving in an undignified manner, as it is in the empowerment of 
that person to act freely.   
Their argument works, crucially, by substituting the concept of autonomy with 
that of ageŶĐǇ.  While autoŶoŵǇ suggests iŶǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ ;aŶd iŶ Nussďauŵ͛s 
terms, the purity of GlauĐoŶ͛s ĐhoiĐeͿ, ageŶĐǇ is ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ďǇ a ƌeĐogŶitioŶ, 
firstly, that agents do not always act morally, and secondly that agents 
recognise that they may be harmed (either by other agents or by causal 
factors).  Agency thus embraces precisely the self-awareness of finitude and 
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mortality analysed by Heidegger.  The agent may choose to act in ways that 
Đoŵpƌoŵise theiƌ digŶitǇ, aŶd BeǇleǀeld aŶd BƌoǁŶsǁoƌd͛s faǀouƌed eǆaŵple 
is that of Manuel Wackenheim, a dwarf who argued that he had the right to be 
used in Dwarf throwing competitions – a choice that seems to surrender his 
dignity as a human being (2001, pp. 25-7).  Dignity thereby comes to be seen, 
not as a clearly defined set of behaviours or rights, but rather as something 
that is continually negotiated and ĐoŶtested, ďetǁeeŶ the iŶdiǀidual͛s 
assertion of their desire to act freely in a certain way, pursuing certain ends 
that they personally regard as good, and a socially accepted conception of the 
good life of the human being.  If there is a dignity in accepting and responding 
ĐƌeatiǀelǇ to the iŵŵoƌalitǇ of otheƌs aŶd ĐoŶtiŶgeŶĐǇ of the ageŶt͛s ďodǇ aŶd 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, theŶ theƌe is also a digŶitǇ iŶ the ageŶt͛s ƌespoŶse to the soĐial 
(moral and legal) restraints placed upon them. 
To flourish may be understood as acting with dignity, in something akin to 
BeǇleǀeld aŶd BƌoǁŶsǁoƌd͛s aƌtiĐulatioŶ of the ĐoŶĐept.  AgeŶts flouƌish aŶd 
do so precisely because they lack full autonomy.  Yet we would argue that the 
concept of flourishing can offer a richer account than that of dignity, not least 
in that it is more obviously sundered from the Kantian stress on autonomy.  
Specifically in the context of healthcare, flourishing does not make demands 
for rights, or even the acceptance legal restraints.  It is rather, we will argue, a 
way of finding resources to make sense of the contingencies of disease and 
injury, and thus to know how to go on, as an agent acting meaningfully, in the 
face of vulnerability. 
 
Flourishing and Psychological States 
Flourishing may appear to be a superfluous additional concept in the armoury 
of the bioethicist.  In that a flourishing life implies a successful one, and one 
that is recognised as being successful by the person who lives it, it may be 
suggested that flourishing is reducible to such psychological categories as 
happiness, well-being or quality of life.  We would argue that none of these 
terms capture the depth of flourishing.   
While happiness plays an important role in utilitarian arguments, there is a 
fundamental difference between a person being happy at any given moment 
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and that person having lived a happy life.  A happy life may be understood as a 
life that has more happy moments than unhappy ones (or at least, a higher 
intensity of happiness than unhappiness), and we would suggest that this is the 
basic utilitarian understanding.  Conversely, a happy life may be one that is 
happy as a whole.  This is a more complex and nuanced understanding, and we 
would suggest, one that begins to establish something fundamental to what it 
means to flourish.   
This may be explored further by considering the example of the Lotus Eaters 
fƌoŵ Hoŵeƌ͛s Odyssey (Bk IX: lines 64-104).  While Odysseus strives to get 
home, his crew stumble across the isle of the Lotus Eaters.  The fruit of the 
Lotus is a narcotic.  The Lotus Eaters are happy (and indeed safe from the perils 
of the ǀoǇage hoŵeͿ, aŶd Ǉet, at least fƌoŵ OdǇsseus͛ peƌspeĐtiǀe, theiƌs ǁill 
not be a happy life.  He drags his crew, kicking and screaming, back to the 
ships.  The intuition expressed in this story suggests, primarily, that there may 
be sources of happiness that are inappropriate, and inappropriate precisely 
because they do not cohere with the fundamental demands of human nature.  
Narcotic happiness is a renunciation, and not a fulfilment, of what it is to be 
human.  As such, certain forms of happiness are at odds with a flourishing life.  
;Mill͛s distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ higheƌ aŶd loǁeƌ pleasuƌes stƌiǀes to Đaptuƌe 
something of this intuition (2002, ch 2).)  Yet more subtly, the story suggests 
that the life of the Lotus Eaters falls short because it is a life of immediate 
gratification, and as such a life without structure or development.  While 
Odysseus suffers hardships and dangers on his journey, it is a quest that, if 
successful, will come to a meaningful culmination.  Even if unsuccessful, the 
goal of home makes the actions performed on the journey meaningful.  In the 
context of the quest for home, choices can always be made as how to go on.  
Meaning thus trumps mere happiness in a fulfilled and thus flourishing life.   
The ĐoŶĐept of ͚ǁell-ďeiŶg͛ is tǇpiĐallǇ aƌtiĐulated iŶ a ŵoƌe sophistiĐated 
fashioŶ thaŶ is ͚happiŶess͛ ;GƌiffiŶ ϭϵϴϲͿ, Ŷot least iŶ ƌeĐogŶisiŶg that ǁell-
being is not merely that which gives personal or material satisfaction, but that 
genuine well-being has a moral component.  Further, well-being is understood 
as both the condition of a good life and the goal towards which that life 
aspires.  Precisely in that well-being thereby suggests striving towards some 
goal, it entails a structuring of experience over a whole lifetime, and not the 
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mere aggregation of separate moments of happiness.  We would, 
nevertheless, argue that well-being typically lacks an appropriate sensitivity to 
the vulnerability of the human being, and particularly to that of the patient.  
Well-ďeiŶg, foƌ eǆaŵple as aŶ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of Aƌistotle͛s eudaemonia, 
suggests that material comfort is one of its necessary, albeit not sufficient, 
conditions.  This entails that well-being cannot be enjoyed in a condition of 
poverty.  The moral weight of well-being, as a practical claim, may thus rest in 
the demand that all have a right to appropriate material resources in order to 
have the possibility of well-being.  Rawls political philosophy, and its focus on 
primary goods (Rawls 1971), may be so read.  If this is an appropriate 
interpretation of well-being, it entails that the ill person cannot flourish.  The 
patient is a person who has had well-being denied them, and the task of the 
medical system is to restore the material conditions (such as bodily health or at 
least appropriate aids and prosthetics) necessary to well-being.  Chronic and 
incurable diseases pose a fundamental challenge to any such view. 
FiŶallǇ, the ŵoƌe speĐifiĐallǇ ŵediĐal ĐoŶĐept of ͚ƋualitǇ of life͛ ŵaǇ ďe seeŶ 
also to have certain affinities with flourishing.  The quality of life movement 
sought to Đaptuƌe the patieŶt͛s suďjeĐtiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe of health Đaƌe, aŶd 
thereby to offer an evaluation of the success of medical interventions that is 
complementary to the more objective physiological measures (Bowling 2004).  
The more sophisticated psychometric instruments currently in use do much, 
not merely to measure and quantify the subjective experience of health care 
interventions, but also to allow an understanding of the importance of health 
to the patieŶt.  The patieŶt͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁill ďe ŵeasuƌed oǀeƌ a seƌies of 
diŵeŶsioŶs, alloǁiŶg the iŵpaĐt of illŶess upoŶ, foƌ eǆaŵple, the patieŶt͛s 
social functioning, family life, emotional life, and leisure activities, to be 
recorded.  The quality of life instrument thus says much about the vulnerability 
of the patieŶt, aŶd the degƌee to ǁhiĐh illŶess iŵpaiƌs the patieŶt͛s seŶse of 
well-being.  Yet the initial implication here is that the patient is the passive 
victim of disease, injury and disability (all of which reduce quality of life) and 
the passive recipient of medical treatments (that ideally enhance quality of 
life).   
There is here a hint of something more subtle (see Bowling 2004, pp. 160-2).  
The patieŶt͛s ƋualitǇ of life ŵaǇ ǀaƌǇ, Ŷot siŵplǇ as a fuŶĐtioŶ of the seǀeƌitǇ of 
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the medical condition or efficacy of the treatment, but also as their 
expectations and understanding of the condition changes.  Thus, to take a 
relatively crude example, the initial fall in quality of life caused by paralysis is 
typically reversed, even if the condition is permanent, over the period of a 
year.  The patient becomes used to their condition, and modifies their 
expectations and goals appropriately.  They flourish for they come to re-
identify themselves.  They cease to be a failed able-bodied person, and instead 
become a successful person with disabilities.  The crucial challenge, and we 
would suggest one that the concepts of happiness and well-being fail to meet, 
is thus to see the patient not as a failed healthy person (see Callinas, this 
issue).  A patient may flourish as a patient if they strive to experience and 
practice their life as a structured and thus meaningful whole, despite the 
absence of certain material conditions of well-being. 
 
Flourishing and Narrative 
Disease and injury are, most fundamentally, abnormalities in the functioning of 
the huŵaŶ ďodǇ.  Thƌough the disƌuptioŶ of the ďodǇ͛s ĐapaĐities, the peƌsoŶ͛s 
life is disturbed.  While ill, normal activities have, typically, to be suspended or 
curtailed.  The ill person may be unable to work, to care for their family and to 
enjoy their leisure, or at least the ease and facility with which they did those 
things while healthy is significantly limited.  This is precisely that with which 
the measurement of quality of life concerns itself.  The embodied nature of 
illness entails that attempts to repair physical damage, or to compensate for it 
(e.g. through the application of prostheses), and thus to restore the material 
conditions of well-being, are vital.  However, if such technological 
interventions are the only resource available to the medical service, and 
indeed the only resource upon which the patient can call, then, as noted 
above, it may be argued that the patient, while under treatment, has no well-
being (or at least, the well-being is curtailed proportionately to the severity of 
the illness and burden of treatment experienced).  This might suggest, not 
merely that acutely ill patients, but also that the chronically ill and the 
incurable cannot flourish. 
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While acute illness may disrupt a portion of a life (so allowing for well-being 
and a high quality of life both before and after the illness), chronic illness may 
disrupt a life as a whole.  Consider a woman who, while wanting to start a 
family, has made the decision to postpone pregnancy and motherhood until 
her career is established, and she can thereby offer a secure environment for 
her family.  The woman has a clear understanding of the purpose of her life as 
a whole, and has made rational decisions as to how to achieve that purpose.  
However, the human is a plant as well as an autonomous decision-maker – 
Heideggeƌ͛s Da as well as Sein.  If the woman was to succumb to a disease that, 
for its successful treatment, required a hysterectomy, and this before she has 
realised the intention of having a child, then the rationally chosen purpose of 
her life is rendered null.  The illness disrupts her life as whole, potentially 
rendering that life meaningless.  The point is not merely that her plan for the 
future, to have a family, can no longer be realised (and thus the meaning and 
purpose of this future life becomes profoundly ambiguous), but also that the 
past time spent establishing a career, and thus material security for her family, 
is now transformed into time wasted.  The fleeting opportunity to begin a 
family has been squandered.   
If the woman cannot come to terms with her illness and its consequences, then 
hers will be a life that does not flourish.  The exact nature of a failure to 
flourish is significant.  In this context a failure to flourish may be rooted in a 
resignation to the situation or a repression of negative emotions.  Resignation 
entails assuming that nothing can be done.  It focuses on the material 
conditions of well-being, and the fact that there is no further technological 
intervention available to remedy the situation.  As such, it entails a conception 
of the human being as a mere plant, or passive Da, the fate of which is 
dependent wholly upon the technological ingenuity of others and the causal 
influence of the material world.  Repression, and thus the denial that there is a 
problem, focuses wholly and rather perversely on autonomy, and the activity 
of Sein.  It entails a refusal to acknowledge that there is a material problem.  
The human being rises above the material, and the materiality and contingency 
of their own body, but only in a self-deceptive assertion of autonomy.  The two 
attitudes are inauthentic.  This begins to suggest, we would argue, that 
flourishing proper requires an appropriate and realistic acknowledgement of 
the material conditions of suffering, but also an awareness and evocation of 
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the human capacity to discover new purposes, and thus to re-imagine their 
lives.  FlourishiŶg lies iŶ the aďilitǇ to tell a ŵeaŶiŶgful stoƌǇ aďout oŶe͛s life, 
and to use that story as a foundation from which one can go on. 
The work of Alasdair MacIntyre provides an important clue to the analysis of a 
narrative theory of flourishing.  My interest is less in his account of the virtues 
than in his complementary narrative theory (2007, pp. 204-225).  Part of 
MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s ĐoŵplaiŶt agaiŶst ŵodeƌŶ soĐietǇ is that its ŵoƌal Đultuƌe aŶd 
social organisation lead to the fragmentation of individual lives (pp. 204-5).  
People occupy multiple social roles.  Values and goals professed, and even 
demeanour, in the work place may be significantly different to those of the 
home and the family, or with friends in leisure-time.  This is also the problem 
of the cruder utilitarian analysis of happiness, precisely insofar as it offers 
merely an aggregate of isolated psychological experiences, lacking unity.  For 
present purposes, this fragmentation is manifest in illness.  While in what 
Talcott Parsons famously termed the ͚siĐk ƌole͛ ;ϭϵϵϭ, pp. Ϯϵϰ-5) the patient is 
a different person to their healthy-self.  The very notion of the sick role, as a 
transitory hiatus from normality, discourages any attempt to integrate the 
deǀiaŶt eǆpeƌieŶĐe of illŶess iŶto the ƌest of oŶe͛s life.   
MacIntyre argues that an action can only be meaningful if it is understood in 
the context of a broader life story (2007, p. 218).  The movements of a man 
digging have the most minimal meaning until the context is fleshed out.  Thus, 
there is a difference between digging in a garden and in a field; there is a 
difference if the digger is a self-motivated gardener or a man striving to please 
his wife or doctor, by taking healthy exercise.  The commitment to healthy 
exercise itself may no doubt fall into a broader story of a health scare or a 
family history of heart trouble (and so on).  This challenge of interpreting an 
action is not merely one for the observer.  It is a challenge for agents 
themselves.  Without the context of a story, and thus the sense of oneself as a 
character within that story, where this character has goals and a sense of who 
theǇ aƌe stƌiǀiŶg to ďe, the ĐhoiĐe of oŶe͛s Ŷeǆt aĐtioŶ, aŶd thus deĐisioŶs as to 
how to go on, becomes arbitrary.  Choice of action depends upon the 
consequences that the action has, specifically, for the person I think that I am.  
The fragmentation of modern life is thus overcome through a quest for 
narrative unity. 
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It may be noted that MacIntyre places great emphasis on the notion of a quest: 
͚The uŶitǇ of a huŵaŶ life is the uŶitǇ of a Ŷaƌƌatiǀe Ƌuest͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, p. ϮϭϵͿ.  A 
quest, MacIntyre argues, entails a conception of a goal or telos towards which 
one is moving, but that this goal is not fully defined until it is discovered.  Here 
MacIntyre reinforces a critiĐisŵ he ŵakes of Aƌistotle͛s aĐĐouŶt of the ǀiƌtues.  
Aristotle can give a highly specific and seemingly universal account of the 
ǀiƌtues, uŶdeƌstood as the eǆĐelleŶĐes that alloǁ oŶe to aĐhieǀe oŶe͛s goal, 
precisely because he has a definite conception of what the goal of human life 
is, grounded in a metaphysically account of what it is to be human.  
MaĐIŶtǇƌe͛s histoƌiĐallǇ seŶsitiǀe ƌeplǇ is that the ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ǁhat it is to ďe 
human, and thus what the telos of human life is, is reinterpreted in every age 
and society, and indeed, potentially by each individual in their own lives.  This 
point is relevant to any theory of flourishing.  We noted above that it is 
typically argued that one cannot flourish if one acts against (human) nature.  
We have therefore proposed, following Heidegger and Nussbaum, a highly 
minimal view of human nature.  Humans are vulnerable, at once plant and 
autoŶoŵous ďeiŶg.  IŶ BeǇleǀeld aŶd BƌoǁŶsǁoƌd͛s teƌŵ, theǇ aƌe ageŶts.  To 
flourish presupposes that this nature is respected, and that the individual is 
aware that they have both free will and that they are subject to contingency.  
Yet, ǁithiŶ this ŵiŶiŵal ďasis theƌe is ǀast sĐope to eǆploƌe ǁhat oŶe͛s oǁŶ 
personal telos and nature might be.  Flourishing, we therefore argue, is a quest 
to discover who one is.  While MacIntyre stresses the challenge that the 
fragmentation of modern life poses to this quest, we rather stress the 
challenge posed by the contingencies that afflict our choices and autonomy. 
Here we wish briefly to return to Beyleveld and Brownsword, in order to note a 
parallel between their  account of dignity and the telos of flourishing outlined 
aďoǀe.  BeǇleǀeld aŶd BƌoǁŶsǁoƌd aƌgue that the iŶdiǀidual͛s oǁŶ seŶse of 
their dignity (and thus the actions they choose, autonomously, to perform) 
may be at odds with the conceptions of dignity and dignified behaviour held in 
the wider society.  Thus, the dwarf Manuel Wackenheim holds a fundamentally 
different view of dignified behaviour than does French society.  For Beyleveld 
and Brownsword, in this case at least, the social view should trump the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s, theƌeďǇ ĐoŶstƌaiŶiŶg iŶdiǀidual ďehaǀiouƌ.  IŶ teƌŵs of flouƌishiŶg, 
this suggests that what the individual regards as a flourishing life may well be 
at odds with that of their society.  In a given case the attribute of flourishing 
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can be highly contestable.  My point is then, following MacIntyre, that there is 
not a single, metaphysically grounded, definition of flourishing as a telos to 
which all should aspire.  The understanding of flourishing will vary historically 
and culturally.  It will also differ between individuals, so that what it means to 
flourish is a potential site of conflict and negotiation.  Courageous individuals 
may offer new ways of flourishing that, initially, may not be recognised as 
such. 
To return to the main thread of our argument, the experience of contingency 
(not least as experienced in disease or injury) that disrupts a life may now be 
understood as a disruption of the story that patients tell about their lives.  It 
follows that the sort of disruption represented by illness is fundamental to the 
possibility of flourishing.  If a person could lead a trouble-free life, for example 
by having a happy and secure childhood, effortless success in education and 
work, a loving partner, successful children and the peaceful death at a good 
age, it is not clear, on our account, that we could say that they have flourished.  
Their life may have been happy, but only in the sense that the life of the Lotus 
Eater is happy.  The lack of conscious struggle and adversity, and thus a lack of 
aŶ oǀeƌt eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith oŶe͛s oǁŶ ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ, eŶtails that theƌe is Ŷo 
stimulus to reflect upon life as a whole.  There is no stimulus to tell or re-tell a 
life story.  This happy person can live in the present like the Louts Eater, or 
perhaps worse, assuming that they tell a life story, they tell a story that 
ƌeĐogŶises oŶlǇ theiƌ autoŶoŵǇ.  TheǇ tell the stoƌǇ of a ͚self-ŵade͛ ŵaŶ oƌ 
woman.  Acute illness potentially plays an important part in such a life.  In 
acute illness, vulnerability and contingency intrude upon the self-delusion of 
pure autonomy.  While the story of the sick role encourages the person to 
ignore its significance, separating the experience of illness from that of the 
͚tƌue͛ self, ŵoƌe pƌofouŶdlǇ it ĐaŶ ďe ƌeĐogŶised as the ŵoŵeŶt at ǁhiĐh oŶe 
has the possibility of recognising the contingency and fortune that underpins 
even a happy life, and which makes that life possible. 
To turn back to the issue of chronic illness, our example of the woman who 
undergoes a hysterectomy indicates how severe and chronic disease can, 
unlike acute illness, be undeniable, as it disrupts the sense of who the person is 
as a whole.  As the old stoƌǇ of the ǁoŵaŶ͛s life ďeĐoŵes uŶǀiaďle, so too does 
the character, and thus the personal identity, that lies at the centre of that 
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story.  Without character or story, the woman cannot go on.  The narrative 
framework within which decisions about the appropriateness or otherwise of 
actions is stripped away.  Only the creation of a new story and a new character 
for herself will resolve this impasse.  Such a story is not merely a story of the 
ƌest of the ǁoŵaŶ͛s life, ďut also a ƌetelliŶg of the past, so that it ceases to be 
futile.  This is difficult, and is why many fail to flourish, consumed by regrets 
and recriminations.  As the notion of quest highlights, the new story is not 
soŵethiŶg that ĐaŶ siŵplǇ ďe iŵposed, ďǇ ǁill, upoŶ oŶe͛s life.  It is, ƌatheƌ, 
something for which one searches.   This search entails practical activity.  The 
stoƌǇ of oŶe͛s life is a stoƌǇ that is liǀed.  The Ŷeǁ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ŵust theƌefoƌe ďe 
embodied.  Quests entail experiments and thus failures, as well as successes.  
The new character and story will not simply emerge in a fruitful cycle of being 
lived and told, but will have to be re-told and reinterpreted, not least as dead-
ends and failures are encountered, but also as new opportunities are 
recognised. 
MacIntyre argues, with some subtlety, that there are different ways in which 
the story of a life can be told (2007, pp. 212-3).  The same events can be 
narrated as a heroic saga, a tragedy, a romantic comedy and so on.  Not all 
genres are appropriate to all stories, and the flourishing of an individual life will 
depend significantly upon the way in which that life-story is told.  Not all 
stoƌies haǀe happǇ eŶdiŶgs.  To ƌeĐogŶise the tƌagedǇ of oŶe͛s life, aŶd to fiŶd 
meaning in that, is different from inauthentic despair or denial (see Edgar 
2007).  Yet this further suggests that for the patient to flourish, they must have 
access to appropriate narrative resources.  The patient does not exist in 
isolation.  As a social being they draw upon the stories already told to them.  
Again, even in the creative activity of the imagination, the person, like a plant, 
is in need of cultivation.  The storyteller is no more the isolated and 
autonomous Kantian individual than is the patient.  A lack of sympathetic 
stories inhibits flourishing.  As Frank has argued, if the only story one has 
available, as a patient, is that of the sick role, then chronic illness is 
meaningless (1995, pp. 5-6).  The sick role tells a story that it is normal to fall 
ill, folloǁ oŶe͛s doĐtoƌ͛s iŶstƌuĐtioŶs, aŶd so get ďetter.  The dominant story of 
acute illness, as we have argued, fragments a life.  The experience of illness is 
plaĐed outside of oŶe͛s supposedlǇ tƌue oƌ autheŶtiĐ stoƌǇ.  ChƌoŶiĐ illŶess 
does not allow either for the happy ending or recovery, or for the 
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sequestƌatioŶ of illŶess fƌoŵ the ƌest of oŶe͛s liǀe.  ChƌoŶiĐ illŶess thus poses 
relentlessly the challenge that all illness in fact represents.  Even acute illness, 
as we have argued, highlights the truth of our vulnerability (and thus the 
human nature of which we must take account if we are to flourish).  A culture 
that offers only the superficial story of the sick role, and thus a culture without 
stories of chronic illness, or a culture that offers only stories that condemn the 
chronically ill as malingerers or as permanently ineffectual), as Frank argues, 
entails that the continuation of the illness is experienced as meaningless (for 
hoǁ ĐaŶ oŶe go oŶ, if Ŷo aĐtioŶ leads to a ĐuƌeͿ oƌ ǁoƌse, as oŶe͛s oǁŶ fault.  
Crucially, it is here that the patient needs to be understood as a character in 
their own right, and not as a failed healthy person.  Yet again, the story of the 
chronically ill or disabled person may be in a very different genre to that of the 
seemingly untroubled healthy person, but it may also be a richer story, and 
thus say much about the vulnerability inherent to all humanity. 
 
Flourishing and Institutions 
We have, above, explored the conditions under which it may be said that an 
individual flourishes.  We argue that flourishing requires the agent to recognise 
their vulnerability and contingency, and to use their imagination and thus their 
autonomy to engage honestly with that contingency.  A flourishing life, taken 
as a whole, is thus not a life spared contingencies, or even spared mistakes, 
setbacks and tragedies.  It is rather a life that has engaged with and made 
sense of those contingencies.  Chronic illness is typically a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, stimulus to this engagement.  The disruption of the experience of 
illness prompts reflection upon what it is to be human, and within this context 
ǁhat the puƌpose of oŶe͛s oǁŶ life ĐaŶ ďe.  IŶ flouƌishiŶg the iŶdiǀidual dƌaǁs 
upon the resources culturally available to them in order to tell and re-tell the 
story of their life, and construct and re-construct themselves as the hero of this 
story. 
Flourishing may appear to be a quality of the individual, and indeed it can 
appear self-centred or egotistical.  We argue, however, that the individual is 
necessarily a social creature.  We have suggested above that the attribution of 
flourishing is always potentially contestable, as social and individual 
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conceptions of flourishing diverge.  Yet, as social beings, we draw upon the 
culture around us in order to provide templates and models for our own story 
telling.  As story-tellers, our stories overlap and intertwine with those of 
otheƌs.  MaĐIŶtǇƌe elegaŶtlǇ Ŷotes that:  ͚IŶ ŵǇ dƌaŵa, peƌhaps, I aŵ Haŵlet oƌ 
Iago or at least the swineherd who may yet become a prince, but to you I am 
only A Gentleman or at best Second Murderer, while you are my Polonius or 
ŵǇ Gƌaǀediggeƌ, ďut Ǉouƌ oǁŶ heƌo͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ, pp. Ϯϭϯ-4).  If flourishing is a moral 
quality, and not merely a prudential one characterised by practical success, 
then to flourish entails respecting the stories and lives of others, not least 
through recognising the constraints and demands that those stories place upon 
us.  The stories of others are a significant part of the contingency and luck that 
shapes us.  There is a difference between being a plant that is nourished and 
cultivated by others and a parasite that wilfully saps the energy of its host. 
This reflection may be taken further by suggesting that not merely individuals 
but also institutions can flourish.  Indeed, we would argue more strongly, that 
the individual is more likely to flourish if they are part of a flourishing 
institution.  Institutions, such as hospitals, GP practices, and even a national 
health service, have stories told about them, and the members of the 
institution will tell its story as part of their own.  More precisely, the story that 
one tells of oneself as a member of an institution is in part constituted by the 
story of the institution, for as an individual the agent adopts a character 
specified by the institutional story (e.g. nurse, consultant, manager, cleaner, 
patient).  Just as Hamlet is played differently by each actor who takes on the 
role, so these institutional characters will be played, and their stories told, 
each in the idiom of the individual.  Yet, the flourishing of the institution lies in 
the dialogue that exists between these different individual stories. 
Again, to highlight the nature of institutional flourishing, the nature of a failure 
to flourish may be considered.  Institutions, like individuals, fail to flourish if 
they are unable to make sense of contingency, and as such are unable to go 
on.  As with the individual, the institution may capitulate in the face of 
contingency, being overwhelmed by the apparent impossibility of resolution or 
change, or may retreat into denial.  Above we suggested that the source of 
such failure for the individual lies, not simply in the severity of the contingency 
they face, but crucially in their capacity to create a story.  This capacity relies, 
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not merely upon their own imagination, but also upon the resources they have 
available to them in their culture.  The lack of appropriate stories (as Frank 
highlights in the case of chronically ill patients) inhibits the possibility of 
flourishing.  An institution is necessarily composed of its individual members.  
Thus, in order to flourish it requires individual members who either have the 
imagination to see the world differently, and to communicate that vision to 
others, or members who can draw upon, and if necessarily reshape and retell, 
narrative resources that already exist.  An institution will fail to flourish if there 
are no appropriate stories, or if a single, inappropriate, story dominates.  As 
MacIntyre argues, an institution is in good order when there is an internal 
argument about the purposes and nature of that institution (2007, p. 222).  To 
the degree to which that debate and sharing of stories is inhibited, be it due to 
lack of narrative imagination, lack of narrative resources, or perhaps more 
significantly, an inherent political structure that prevents dialogue and the 
proposal of alternative narratives, the institution will fail to flourish.  Precisely 
because the story of the institution would thereby be an inauthentic one, in 
that this story shapes the stories of the characters who make up the 
iŶstitutioŶ, so too theƌe is a daŶgeƌ that the peƌsoŶal stoƌies of the iŶstitutioŶ͛s 
members will become inauthentic.  They too will fail to flourish, unless they 
can engage with the failure of the institution as part of the contingency of their 
own lives.  Living and working within a failing institution may be as 
fundamental a stimulus to the re-telliŶg of oŶe͛s oǁŶ life stoƌǇ aŶd the 
ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of oŶe͛s oǁŶ ideŶtitǇ aŶd ĐhaƌaĐteƌ as is ĐhƌoŶiĐ illŶess. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
We haǀe pƌoposed the ĐoŶĐept of ͚flouƌishiŶg͛ as haǀiŶg a ƌiĐhŶess aŶd 
precision that allows it, uniquely, to articulate the experience and challenges 
posed to the patient and their carers.  In order to flourish one must recognise 
and confront the vulnerability that lies at the heart of human nature.  As 
agents, humans are at once subject to contingency and luck, and yet have 
imagination and freedom of choice and action.  The experience of contingency, 
not least in illness, may proper reflection upon how one, as an individual, deals 
with that vulnerability.  In the narrative account of flourishing that we have 
offeƌed, this eŶtails uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg oŶeself as a ĐhaƌaĐteƌ iŶ oŶe͛s oǁŶ stoƌǇ.  
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Such a character has certain goals and values.  The character will strive to act in 
a coherent and consistent manner, and thus express a sense of personal 
ideŶtitǇ.  The Ŷaƌƌatiǀe fƌaŵeǁoƌk, that at oŶĐe sets goals foƌ oŶe͛s futuƌe aŶd 
ŵakes seŶse of the aĐhieǀeŵeŶts ;aŶd failuƌesͿ of oŶe͛s past, is the fƌaŵeǁoƌk 
within which one can make decisions about how to go on, and thus the 
framework within which one can act meaningfully. 
While not denying the importance of physiological interventions in the 
treatment of patients, restoring functioning and thus what we have termed the 
material conditions of flourishing, we have also stressed that patients require 
appropriate cultural resources in order to make sense of their condition.  
Without appropriate narrative frameworks, found, for example, in the stories 
of fellow sufferers, and thus ŵodels foƌ oŶe͛s oǁŶ seŶse of ĐhaƌaĐteƌ, illŶess 
threatens to become meaningless.  Such experience of illness renders it a 
hiatus from ordinary life, in which, as Frank argued, the patient becomes 
passive (for how are they to decide to act meaningfully) before the demands of 
the medical process.  To understand flourishing as a narrative quest, and 
crucially a quest that is conducted in co-operation and dialogue with others, is 
to understand health care, not merely as a technical procedure, but also as a 
continuing challenge to understand what it is to be a patient, and thus the 
plaĐe that the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of illŶess plaǇs iŶ oŶe͛s life as a ǁhole. 
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